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‘They’ve Conspired against Us’: Understanding the Role of Social Identification and 
Conspiracy Beliefs in Justification of Ingroup Collective Behaviour 
 
Abstract 
The present research investigates conditions under which beliefs in conspiracy theories 
predict the desire to justify ingroup behaviour in the context of intergroup conflict. We 
propose that within the context of Ukraine’s intergroup conflict over the annexation of 
Crimea, supporters (but not opponents) of the “Euromaidan” social movement are likely to 
validate protesters’ collective actions as just to the extent that they believe that the 
authorities are engaged in annexation-related conspiracies. We also examine the 
moderating role of perceived political corruption in these processes. Using a public opinion 
survey of 315 Ukrainians, we found support for our hypothesized moderated mediation 
model—identification with “Euromaidan” increased beliefs in the annexation-related 
conspiracy theories, which in turn, increased justification of protesters’ actions in the 
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supporters of the Euromaidan who perceived political corruption to be at a low or average 
level.  
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‘They’ve Conspired against Us’: Understanding the Role of Social Identification and 
Conspiracy Beliefs in Justification of Ingroup Collective Behaviour 
The contention that individuals’ beliefs in conspiracy theories tend to coincide with 
their ideological views seems to be well-founded. Extant research has shown that a 
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Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013; Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011; Uscinski & Parent, 2014; 
van Prooijen, Krouwel & Pollet, 2015), and, thus, may have predictable effects on ingroup 
behaviours in the context of intergroup conflict. In so far as ideology is central to one’s 
commitment to social groups and causes, it follows that ideologically-charged social 
identities (often linked to what is called opinion-based group memberships; see McGarty, 
Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009, for an overview) should be relevant to our 
understanding of why some people in society may be particularly prone to endorse specific 
conspiracy theories. Such opinion-based groups, typically formed around ideas about the 
way the world should be, have been regarded as an excellent predictor of coordinated 
collective behaviour (e.g., Baysu & Phalet, 2017; Chayinska, Minescu, & McGarty, 2017). 
However, the idea that a coherent conspiracy-based belief system is aligned with 
individuals’ opinion-based group membership and robustly predictive of social action, 
remains relatively underexplored. Moreover, little research has attempted to conceptually 
clarify and include contextual moderators of apparent differences in conspiracy 
endorsement (see Douglas, Sutton, & Cichocka, 2017, for recent summaries). 
The present research is designed to contribute to a more systematic understanding of 
conspiracy beliefs as an intergroup phenomenon by presenting a theoretical integration of 
the core aspects of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and insights from opinion-
based group membership framework (McGarty, et al., 2009). More precisely, we aim to 
examine the antecedent conditions that elicit one’s tendency a) to believe in conspiracy 
theories and b) use such conspiracy explanations in the justification of ingroup collective 
behaviour in the context of intergroup conflict. First, we contend that one’s commitment to 
an ideologically charged opinion-based group may constitute the antecedent condition 
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Secondly, given the defensive function of social identities and the instrumental role of 
conspiracy explanations, we argue that identifiers (but not non-identifiers) with a certain 
ideologically charged group will be particularly motivated to use such explanations to 
validate the ingroup’s behaviour. 
Finally, we seek to contribute to a more refined understanding of the contextual 
factors that moderate potential causal relationships between ideologically charged social 
identities, conspiracy beliefs, and ingroup justification tendencies. Given the emerging 
evidence for the moderating role of distrust in conspiracy predispositions (e.g., Darwin, 
Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Miller, Saunders, & Farhart, 2016), we seek to explore whether 
individuals’ perception of the political system as corrupt interferes with social identification 
and conspiracy beliefs in justifying ingroup actions. The overall idea is to show that there 
are striking differences in conspiracy thinking not only between identifiers and non-
identifiers, but also within the group of identifiers with a certain opinion-based group, 
depending on people’s trust in political institutions.  
Social Identification with Opinion-Based Groups and Conspiracy Beliefs  
Psychological group membership based on shared ideological beliefs (also known 
as opinion-based group membership) can significantly influence individuals’ beliefs in 
conspiracy theories. This evidence stems from empirical research on the effects of social 
identification with religious groups (e.g., Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2013; Newheiser, et al., 
2011) and political parties (e.g., Edelson, Alduncin, Krewson, Sieja, & Uscinski, 2017; 
Smallpage, Enders, & Uscinski, 2017; van Prooijen, et al., 2015) on one’s tendency to 
engage in motivated conspiracy endorsement. For instance, in the context of a situational 
threat related to terrorist attacks in Indonesia, Mashuri and Zaduqisti (2013) have 
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believe that Western countries were accountable for instigating terrorism in their country 
than those with non-salient religion-based identity.  
Recent insights gleaned from the literature suggest that people with extreme 
political leanings are more prone to endorse different conspiracy theories (e.g., Edelson, et 
al., 2017; van Prooijen, et al., 2015). For instance, Edelson et al. (2017) have shown that 
people were more likely to believe in electoral fraud depending on whether the party they 
identified themselves with won the elections or not. In a similar vein, Uscinski and Parent 
(2014) have shown how one’s partisan identity (i.e., Republican and Democrat) interacted 
with a sense of relative group deprivation and inferior group status to predict beliefs in 
election fraud: individuals on the losing (vs. winning) side of political processes were more 
likely to believe in election-related conspiracy theories. Van Prooijen et al. (2015) found 
that conspiracy beliefs were associated with extremist political beliefs at either side of the 
political spectrum (i.e., “left” and “right”): political extremes were more likely to believe in 
conspiracy theories than political moderates because of their highly structured thinking 
style in which complex social events and groups tend to be categorized in terms of binary 
opposition. Thus, a necessary step in explaining why individuals believe in specific 
conspiracy theories is acknowledging that their ideologies, that is, set of deeply held 
worldviews (i.e., one’s silent opinion-based group membership) may play a causal role in 
the outcome. 
Social Identification, Conspiracy Accusations, and Justification of Ingroup 
Collective Behaviour  
Research based on the social identity tradition has long suggested that individuals 
have a ‘psychological immune system’ that helps them to see their ingroup and its actions 
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Schmader, 2003) and intergroup conflict (e.g., Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 
1999). In particular, research has shown that group members may adopt various cognitive 
strategies that will allow them to interpret reality in a manner that protects collective self-
integrity and self-esteem (e.g., Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). Recently, some authors 
(e.g., Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kofta, & Wojcik, 2013; Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de 
Zavala, & Olechowski, 2016) have shown that the use of a conspiracy-tinged rhetoric is 
predicted by individuals’ motivation to defend their silent social identities. For instance, 
Cichocka and colleagues (Cichocka, et al., 2016) have demonstrated that people with a 
defensive form of ingroup positivity (i.e., collective narcissists) were generally prone to 
attribute conspiracy explanations to certain events, because attribution of blame to others 
substantially allowed them to protect a positive image of the ingroup. These authors, 
however, have not considered the possibility that beliefs in conspiracy theories can also act 
as a mediator in the existing relationship, and, as such, may be recruited by identifiers to 
defensively construct or restore a positive image of their subjectively valued group. Given 
the correlational evidence Cichocka et al. (2016) have provided it appears reasonable to 
expect that identifiers with an ideologically charged opinion-based group will be 
predisposed to believe in specific conspiracy theories to the extent that the latter allows 
them to justify the ingroup’s collective behaviour in the context of intergroup conflict.  
To conclude, recent work had already shown that group members strategically 
endorse conspiracy theories to satisfy particular ingroup needs. The present study suggests 
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The Moderating Role of the Perceived Political Corruption  
The other key caveat which the present study acknowledges is that the perceived 
corruption of the political system is likely to be both psychologically consequential of the 
salient group membership and robustly predictive of beliefs in conspiracy theories. Some 
authors (e.g., Della Porta & Vannucci, 1997; Miller, et al., 2016) have suggested that 
people who perceive political corruption to be an embedded feature of states’ political 
institutions will be more prone to see politicians as those who tend to side-step or even 
tailor specific arrangements to fit their personal rather than the country’s best interests. For 
instance, Miller et al. (2016) have shown how people who were both highly knowledgeable 
about politics and distrustful of the authorities were generally predisposed to endorse 
ideologically motivated conspiracy theories. Lending further credence to this speculation, 
other scholars have demonstrated that conspiracy beliefs are a by-product of a cluster of 
personality-related traits revolving around distrust (e.g., Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & 
Gregory, 1999; Darwin, et al., 2011), delusional thinking (e.g., Swami, et al., 2011), and 
alienation (e.g., Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013). Consistent with these studies, 
believing in conspiracy theories allow people who are high in these traits to reject any 
official explanation offered by the “establishment” as being false. We thus examine 
whether and how perceived political corruption may moderate the effect of social 
identification with an opinion-based group and conspiracy beliefs on ingroup justification 
tendencies.   
An opportunity to test these ideas presented itself in the context of the social-
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Study Background: The Conspiracy Theories on Crimea’s Annexation 
The annexation of Ukraine's Crimea has been regarded as the ‘fastest effective 
secession in modern history’ (Christakis, 2015, p. 77). In the span of three weeks, Russian 
Special Forces invaded the peninsula, the regional pro-Moscow authorities called for a 
referendum on the status of Crimea, in which a sizeable majority of the population voted to 
join Russia. This allowed the Russian parliament to formalize Crimea's unilateral secession 
from Ukraine two days after the official results of the referendum were revealed (e.g., 
Myers, 2014). Although Ukraine's top officials denounced Russia’s military takeover of 
Crimea aligning their condemnations with the anti-Russia protests in Kyiv, some 
commentators have raised doubts as to whether or not the state’s government were bribed 
to let Crimea go (e.g., Weigel, 2014). In 2017, three years after these events (and at the 
time of this study), the Ukrainian state authorities have not yet presented a coherent 
strategy to de-occupy the peninsula in spite of the seemingly global condemnation of 
Russia’s invasion and the domestic (latent) resistance movement (e.g., Makarenko, 2017). 
A combination of the government’s political inaction and rampant state-sanctioned 
corruption in Ukraine have generated a climate of public discontent and frustration 
(Holcomb, Conlon, & Hryckowian, 2016; Khylko & Tytarchuk, 2017).  
Study Aims 
The present research was designed to make three novel contributions to the 
literature. First, based on social identity theory we argue that people’s tendency to believe 
in a particular set of conspiracy theories should be predicted by their social identification 
with specific opinion-based groups. Within the context of Ukraine’s intergroup conflict 
over the annexation of Crimea, we argue that supporters (but not opponents) of the 
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conspiracy theories. Secondly, we argue that supporters of the Euromaidan will be more 
likely to justify ingroup collective behaviour to the extent that they attribute nefarious 
intent to the government by endorsing annexation-related conspiracy theories. Finally, we 
expect to reveal the moderating role of perceived political corruption in these processes: 
identifiers who perceive the state’s political institutions to be corrupt may be particularly 
likely to believe in the government’s involvement in the annexation, and thus, will be more 
prone to justify the ingroup collective action in the course of confrontation. Figure 1 
displays the conceptual model. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Method 
Participants and Procedure  
Participants were recruited using snowball convenience sampling. The data were 
collected between March 30 and April 21, 2017, three years after Ukraine’s peninsula of 
Crimea was annexed by the Russian Federation. After consenting to participate, 
participants completed socio-demographic measures and then were asked to complete the 
survey
1
 . The items were available in Ukrainian. In order to guarantee coherence and 
validity of the questions, all items were translated from English to Ukrainian and back 
using a standard translation-back-translation procedure (Brislin, 1970). Participants were 
required to be of the Ukrainian nationality and aged over 18. 
Four hundred and seven volunteers entered the survey. Three hundred and fifteen 
participants (77.40 %) completed all survey items and were included in the final sample. 
                                                            
1 The survey also included the measures of self-blame, group-based emotion in relation to Crimea’s 
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The sample ranged in age from 18 to 76 (M age 20.85 years, SD = 12.89) and comprised 
54.8 % women. Participants were highly educated (45.8 % having graduated from 
university), 55.9 % were employed full time, and 65.4 % indicated Ukrainian as their first 
language. Some 77 % reported that they completed this survey while in Ukraine, 23.1 % – 
while living abroad. 
Measures 
Socio-demographics. Participants indicated age, gender, current residence, 
educational level, employment status and mother tongue (i.e., Ukrainian, Russian, other). 
Social identification with supporters of the Euromaidan. Participants rated four 
items used to measure their social identification with the Euromaidan protest movement. 
They were asked to what extent they think of themselves as of a ‘supporter’, ‘participant’, 
‘typical member’, and ‘activist’ of the Euromaidan movement (α =.78). These and other 
measures below used five-point Likert scales labelled from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 
(Strongly agree). 
Social identification with opponents of the Euromaidan. Two items were used to 
assess the extent to which participants identified themselves as an ‘opponent’, and 
‘antagonist’ of the Euromaidan movement (α =.85). 
Crimea-related conspiracy theories. Five items, most of which were adapted from 
Douglas and Leite (2017), were used to measure participants’ beliefs in the conspiracy 
theories over Crimea’s annexation. These items were: “There is an influential secretive 
group that has long ago decided the ‘destiny’ of Crimea’s question”, “Political decisions 
about Crimea’s annexation have been greatly influenced by a small influential political 
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“A small group of people makes all of the political decisions to suit their own interests”, 
and “In Ukraine, a small group of people secretly manipulates political events” (α =.81). 
Perceived political corruption. Further participants were asked: “How corrupt or 
incorrupt do you think are each of the following groups?” The five groups were: courts, 
police, parliament’s majority, parliament’s opposition, and government. A principal 
component analysis (PCA) revealed that all five items loaded highly into one factor which 
explained 55.54 % of the total variance (KMO =.74, χ
2
 = 528.66, df = 10, p < .000). The 
items were averaged to yield an index of perceived political corruption (α = .80). 
Justification of the protesters’ collective behaviour. Four items were used to 
measure respondents’ evaluation of the protesters’ collective behaviour during the anti-
Russia protests over Crimea’s annexation in the spring of 2014. Participants were asked to 
indicate the degree to which they felt that the actions of social activists during the 
Euromaidan events were ‘moral’, ‘upright’, ‘just’, and ‘illegal’ (reverse coded). The results 
of the PCA supported a 1-factor structure of the scale: KMO analysis yielded an index of 
.79 and BTS (χ
2
 = 548.67, df = 6, p < .000) with the items accounting for 71.57 % of the 
total variance. The internal consistency estimate of reliability was excellent (α = .87). The 
full data file can be found at this link on the OSF site. 
Results 
Preliminary Analysis 
Little’s MCAR test indicated that data were missing completely at random (χ2 (55) 
= 64.41, p = .18). Therefore, missing values were not problematic and analysis was 
conducted without imputation being made (92 cases were removed from the final analysis). 
The preliminary analyses involved bivariate analysis and linear hierarchical regression to 
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centered when computing interaction terms to minimize colinearity. The correlations 
between all variables, means, and standard deviations are presented in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Overall, the regression analyses indicated that social identification with the 
supporters of the Euromaidan (Model 1) was a significant positive predictor of the 
justification of the protesters’ collective behaviour (B=.58, t = 12.47, p < .001), whereas 
social identification with the opponents of the movement (Model 2) had a significant 
negative effect (B= –.23, t = – 4.07, p < .001) on the outcome variable. When testing Model 
1 for the potential effects of the moderator and mediator, we found that social identification 
with the supporters of the Euromaidan predicted justification of the protesters’ collective 
behaviour (adjusted R
2
 = .33, ΔF(2,31) = 155.56, p = .000) at Step 1 and that the 
explanatory power of the model was significantly improved after adding the interaction 
term (R
2
 = .39, ΔF (2,31) = 15.36, p = .000) at Step 2 and conspiracy beliefs (R
2
 = .39, ΔF 
(2,31) = 4.41, p =.037) at Step 3, respectively. Thus, the more people identified as 
supporters of the Euromaidan, the more likely they were to evaluate the actions of the 
ingroup as just, and these evaluations were further strengthened by their perceptions of the 
political institutions as corrupt and beliefs that there were larger conspiracies at work 
around the annexation of Crimea by Russia.  
Main Analysis 
We conducted two sets of moderated mediation analyses to test whether the effects 
of social identification with the supporters (IV1) and opponents (IV2) of the Euromaidan 
protest movement on justification of protesters’ collective action (DV) were mediated by 
beliefs in the annexation-related conspiracy theories (MV), and whether these indirect 
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 Bootstrapping with 1,000 resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) revealed that an 
indirect effect of social identity on justification of the protesters’ actions through the 
annexation-related conspiracy beliefs was significant for the supporters of the Euromaidan 
(IE = −.05, SE = .02, 95% CI = [−.10, −.01]; Figure 2a) but not for the opponents of the 
movement (IE = −.02, SE = .03, 95% CI = [−.09, .03]; Figure 2b). Thus, the more people 
identified themselves as the supporters of the Euromaidan movement, the more they were 
likely to believe in the annexation-related conspiracy theories, which, in turn, led to their 
validation of the ingroup collective actions in this conflict as just and moral. In contrast, the 
more people identified themselves as the opponents of the Euromaidan movement, the less 
they were likely to justify the protesters’ behaviour. Consistent with our prediction, the 
relationship between their social identities and conspiracy beliefs was non-significant. 
Interestingly, for the opponents of the Euromaidan the link between conspiracy beliefs and 
justification of the protesters’ actions was significantly positive (b= .27, SE = .06, 95% CI 
.16, .38, Figure 2b), pointing out to the fact that not only identifiers with the movement but 
also its ideological opponents were keen to validate actions of the protesters as just and 
moral when they held a set of beliefs that powerful groups within the government plotted 
for the annexation. 
[Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
Consistent with our prediction, the moderating variable significantly affected the 
magnitude of the existing relationship. However, it also showed an unexpected direction: 
when the supporters of the Euromaidan perceived corruption to be at a low (SE = .07, 95% 
CI = [.02, .13]) or average (SE = .02, 95% CI = [.01, .05]) level, they were more likely to 
believe in the conspiracy theories surrounding Crimea’s annexation and justify the 
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identifiers were less likely (SE = −.02, 95% CI = [−.06, −.00]) to believe in the conspiracy 
theories and justify their own actions via such beliefs. Thus, the perception of political 
corruption as excessive had paradoxical effects not only on the supporters’ conspiracy 
beliefs but also on their justification of ingroup collective behaviour. 
Discussion 
The results of this study present evidence for the hypothesis that identifiers (as 
opposed to non-identifiers) with the Euromaidan protests movement were particularly 
likely to justify the ingroup’s collective behaviour in the context of intergroup conflict over 
annexed Crimea to the extent that they believed that powerful groups within the 
government plotted for the annexation. The results also point to the counterintuitive effects 
of perceived political corruption in moderating people’s justification of ingroup actions. 
Our findings contribute to the understanding of two processes. The first is that they 
help to understand the role of social identification with specific opinion-based groups in 
determining one’s tendency to believe in particular conspiracy theories. Previous research 
(e.g., Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2013; Newheiser, et al., 2011; van Prooijen, et al., 2015) has 
shown that people with stable ideological belief systems were more prone to endorse 
specific conspiracy theories. In the present study, we sought to make few steps further in 
highlighting the role of social identification processes in conspiracy thinking. We revealed 
that ideologically charged social identities formed around sharply antagonistic public 
opinions (i.e., pro and against the Euromaidan movement) acted as excellent predictors of 
conspiracy beliefs as they allowed identifiers to extrapolate the idea that there was a 
powerful and evil outgroup engaged in nefarious acts against the ingroup. Additionally, we 
found that conspiracy beliefs served a defensive function of social identity: by accusing the 
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likely to justify the ingroup’s collective efforts (i.e., mass-protest actions) aimed at winning 
back the peninsula. 
These findings are in line with the results of previous studies (e.g., Uscinski & 
Parent, 2014) showing how the division into “us” and “them” paves the way for 
motivational conspiracy endorsement in which individuals on the losing (vs. winning) side 
of political processes are particularly likely to endorse conspiracy theories that help them 
justify the ingroup behaviour. Thus, the findings of the present study support the 
importance of considering the effects of one’s salient psychological group memberships in 
understanding how conspiracy beliefs may be used by identifiers strategically to justify the 
ingroup’s behaviour. 
On the other hand, the results contribute to a better understanding of individual-
level heterogeneity in endorsing conspiracy beliefs. We found that for people who in 
general were less suspicious of the misconduct of the governing authorities (low perceived 
political corruption), social identification with the protest movement boosted conspiracy 
beliefs, which in turn translated into higher willingness to justify ingroup collective 
behaviour. However, for the supporters of the Euromaidan movement who perceived the 
system to be excessively corrupt, beliefs in annexation-related conspiracy theories 
paradoxically flowed onto lesser justification of the ingroup’s actions. This pattern is a new 
discovery that indicates how group justification tendencies (i.e., evaluating the ingroup 
favourably) by means of conspiracy accusations may be minimized by the inherent 
constraints of the social system. These seemingly paradoxical effects may be context-
driven: in a society with a spread of corruption in the public sphere, the individual tendency 
to mistrust the system may make it difficult for people to muster up the evidence necessary 
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events. In other words, this finding indicates how perceiving the authorities to be both 
powerful and corrupt (i.e., having the last word in deciding collective fate) may constrain 
the individual tendency to justify ingroup collective behaviour.  
Politically, this can also be explained by the fact that the legal status of protest itself 
was changed during the social movements of changing the regime (e.g., Cohen, 2014). This 
has created a vacuum of possibilities, where participating in the Euromaidan protests could 
be perceived as equally legal (by those believing in democratic participatory values) and 
illegal (by those abiding by the changed laws at the time of the Euromaidan movement). 
Asking people to evaluate protesters’ collective action retrospectively may have resulted in 
a similar vacuum effect whereby people certain of having done the just thing, might still 
have been unsure whether their action was considered legal according to the then-official-
government legislation. 
To conclude, these findings add to the literature on conspiracy beliefs as they show 
for the first time that social identification with opinion-based groups is a powerful 
antecedent of motivational conspiracy endorsement. Such context-dependent, ideology-
driven beliefs are linked to people’s flexible evaluations of social reality thereby providing 
an important defensive function for social identity within the context of intergroup conflict.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although this research is promising, it presents some limitations. First, these data 
are cross-sectional and definitely need to be backed up by both longitudinal and 
experimental evidence. Secondly, in the present study we only zoomed in on conspiracy 
beliefs as an intergroup phenomenon pointing out the connection between ideologically 
charged social identities, a particular set of conspiracy beliefs, and group justification 
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intergroup conspiracy beliefs such as political cynicism (Swami, et al., 2011), lack of 
psychological empowerment (Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013), and 
feelings of relative deprivation and victimhood (e.g., Bilewicz, et al., 2013), but the present 
study did not account for their effects in the conceptual model. These can act as self-
defeating mechanisms of motivated social cognition that can combine in unspecified ways 
to produce distinct patterns of intra- and intergroup behavior (Douglas et al., 2017). Future 
research would benefit from a more fine-tuned examination of the processes by which 
group identification predicts beliefs in intergroup conspiracy theories and the mechanisms 
by which they trigger the defensive behaviour of the ingroup. Lastly, given the correlational 
nature of these findings, as mentioned above, another avenue for future research would be 
to examine reverse causality in a prospective cohort study. Despite these potential 
methodological limitations, this study can lay the groundwork for a systematic research on 
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Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (N = 315) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 M SD 
1. Euromaidan Supporters -- -.00 .16** .30** .58** 2.45 1.45 
2. Euromaidan Opponents 
 
-- .11* .12* -.23** 1.10 1.32 
3. Crimea-related conspiracy theories 
  
-- .07 .24** 3.41 1.26 
4. Perceived political corruption 
   
-- .34** 2.19 .89 
5. Justification of the protests’ action 
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